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Introduction 
El Hajj Ahmadou Ahidjo resigned as Cameroon’s president in 1982 and peacefully handed over 
power to Paul Biya. During a period when leaders all too often clung to power or were forced out 
by political or social violence, Ahidjo’s resignation after twenty-two years as president was an 
important example. But in less than a year, relations between Ahidjo and Biya had unraveled. 
Accused of masterminding an attempted coup, Ahidjo stood trial in absentia and was sentenced 
to death. He left Cameroon in 1983 never to return, dying in 1989 in exile in Senegal. When the 
news broke that Ahidjo had died, “Paul Biya breathed a sigh of relief, [and] wished his 
predecessor’s soul a speedy journey to hell,” wrote Victor Le Vine (Krieger 2015: 87).  
Ahidjo’s regime made an indelible impact on the nation. Despite his role in shaping 
Cameroon holistically, scholars have generally focused on domestic policy to the detriment of 
his foreign policy accomplishments (DeLancey 2007; Efouba 2018; Johnson 1970; Joseph 1978; 
Ngoh 2004; Takougang & Krieger 1998). Scholars routinely portray him as ruthless, 
authoritative, and vicious (Eyinga 1978; Bayart 1973). Ahidjo, Jean François Bayart wrote, was 
“the source of all power in the state” and ruled in “an active and personal manner” (1978: 66). 
Abel Eyinga likened the use of torture by the Ahidjo regime to that of South Africa’s apartheid 
government agents, adding that “asphyxiation, hanging, electric shocks, to outright murders” 
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were common practices (1978: 109). Yet he rose in stature with and was repeatedly praised by 
leaders around the world for his external actions. Yakubu Gowon was grateful for Ahidjo’s role 
in mediating the Nigerian Civil War (Torrent 2012). Sammy Kum Buo wrote that Ahidjo was 
“widely respected by his colleagues in the Organization of African Unity” (1973: 32). Western 
diplomats described him as a “highly intelligent leader” who brought stability and economic 
growth to Cameroon (Torrent: 6). The U.S. Department of State affirmed: “most of modern 
Cameroon was built and paved under Ahidjo’s reign,” though it added, “under his rule, 
Cameroon’s human rights record was dismal.”1 The Ahidjo presidency, like that of Leopold 
Senghor and others in the continent, presents a paradox in postcolonial African politics, a subject 
of renewed interest to historians of decolonization and independence (Bamba 2016; Durand 
2007; Rippert 2021).  
A proliferation of studies about the Biya regime has also brought renewed attention to the 
Ahidjo presidency (Anyefru 2017; Kamé 2018; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003; Pommerolle and 
Heungoup 2017). The recurring question is: How could a nation that started with so much 
promise descend so quickly into such significant political, economic, and social problems?2 To 
answer this question and others, scholars scoured libraries and archives in search of 
correspondence and other official records, previously overlooked. While some focus on domestic 
policy (Ngoh 2019), others examine the shaping of Cameroon’s foreign policy, where they 
produced work on Cameroon’s relations with France, Britain, China, and Nigeria (Torrent; Tesi 
2017). In some respects, the objectives of Ahidjo’s foreign policy were all encompassing — 
nonalignment, total liberation of Africa, nonintervention, respect of each nation’s sovereignty, 
and promotion of peace through the support of organizations such as the United Nations (Kombi 
1996). Present at the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Ahidjo stood by the 
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principles of the organization, especially those that dealt with the “total liberation of Africa” and 
abiding by territorial boundaries established at the time of independence (Ahidjo 1964). 
Cameroon’s 1961 constitution and subsequent amendments gave its president the authority to 
make foreign policy, to decide on the nation’s agreements, to ratify treaties, and to determine the 
nations with which to establish diplomatic relations.3 
Although scholars agree that the nation’s foreign policy trajectory originated with Ahidjo, 
many disagree about the effectiveness of methods deployed (Le Vine 1971; Peter and Mbida 
Mbida 2015). Scholarship frames Ahidjo’s foreign policy in three distinct ways: weak, 
makeshift, and pragmatic. Based on extensive and previously unused archival documents and 
interviews relating to Ahidjo’s foreign policy located in Cameroon’s archives in Yaoundé and 
Buea, and a variety of published primary and secondary sources, a new perspective emerges in 
this scholarly debate: Ahidjo designed Cameroon-U.S. relations as a means to protect his 
nation’s sovereignty and promote economic development while simultaneously ensuring his grip 
on power. Ahidjo’s approach established the basis of the nation’s foreign policy for decades. 
The Post-Colonial Archive of Modern Cameroon 
Cameroon’s postcolonial archive is dispersed across the globe and includes repositories 
located in Yaoundé and Buea. Previously unused archival materials shed light on the behind-the-
scenes discussions, decisions, and nuances that took place as Ahidjo formulated his policies. The 
Ministry of External Relations archives in Yaoundé houses many boxes containing letters, 
correspondence, memoranda, reports, and other documents pertaining to Cameroon’s foreign 
relations. Many of those boxes remained sealed partly because scholars have not requested them, 
and scholars of Cameroon foreign policy have focused on relations with France while ignoring 
relations with the U.S. This author and research assistant Pulchérie Irène Pieumi submitted a 
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request and gained access to boxes focusing on Cameroon-U.S. relations. The documents 
provide a context to better understand Ahidjo’s decisions. For example, a detailed report 
submitted on January 2, 1980, by Cameroon’s ambassador in Washington, D.C., to the minister 
of external relations in Yaoundé contained information about U.S. global challenges and actions 
and Congressional deliberations on aid to developing countries.4 The following year, another 
report contained a summary and critique of the new direction of American policy toward Africa.5 
Another example included documents showing when Cameroon weighed its options on how to 
leverage the importance of its geographical location and bilingualism as the U.S. sought to 
expand its products into the countries of Union douanière et économique de l’Afrique centrale 
(UDEAC).6 The available reports were irregular and varied in depth and analysis, but taken 
together, they show carefully thought-out policies based on the gathering of information supplied 
by Cameroonian diplomats in the U.S. The problem of incomplete documents in archives is not 
unique to Cameroon. Nana Osei-Opare’s study of worker discontent in Ghana challenges notions 
that disparage local archives and argues that those archives are essential in “rethinking and 
constructing postcolonial histories from the voices of nonelite persons'' (2021: 64). Problems 
such as “limit access to sources, waste researcher’s time, or even destroy documents,” he 
continues, “are not unique to African history” (64). Kate Skinner concurs. Skinner’s (2020) 
reappraisal of the assassination of Togo’s first president, Sylvanus Olympio, delves into 
challenges of working with archives across nations on both sides of the Atlantic and argues that 
though the documents were incomplete and scattered in archives across several countries, It is 
the researcher’s responsibility to carefully analyze all the available documents and to go “wider 
in search of the connections between one fragment and actual, potential, or absent others” (17). 
While research for this article encountered similar challeneges, the newly available documents 
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confirm the centrality of local archives in the study of the diplomatic history of African nations. 
Among other things, those archives enable historians to analyze the political, economic and 
socio-cultural contexts in which African leaders created and executed their foreign policies. For 
example, documents on Ahidjo’s 1962 visit to the U.S. were scattered in two archives in 
Cameroon and at the John F. Kennedy Library, and some events during that visit as shown in the 
documents were interpreted differently.  
Speeches by Cameroon embassy officials to different communities in the U.S. designed 
to promote their country’s image reflected an understanding of the craft of diplomacy in a new 
age. Soon after taking office, Kennedy informed his ambassadors that diplomacy entailed going 
into the local community to mingle with local people. Cameroonian diplomats in Washington, 
D.C., already engaged in such actions.7 This research would show that Kennedy’s creation of the 
Peace Corps reflected that thinking. Boxes containing copies of Nouvelles du Cameroun, a 
newsletter published intermittently by the Cameroon embassy in Washington, D.C., showcased 
Cameroon as a peaceful and stable nation. Taken together, these documents offer a vital new 
perspective for revisiting the making of Cameroon foreign relations toward the U.S. At the 
National Archives in Yaoundé, director Esther Olembe provided access to recently cataloged 
documents. At the Peace Corps Office in Yaoundé, then-country director LaHoma Romocki 
provided access to archival materials vital to evaluating the performance of the volunteers. In 
addition, interviews and questionnaires pursued lines of questioning that emerged from these 
documents.  
Between 2008 and 2011, Pulchérie and I conducted interviews of Peace Corps 
Volunteers, and their Cameroonian co-workers in seven of the country’s ten regions; we also 
interviewed employees at the Peace Corps office in Yaoundé. In the U.S., Freedom of 
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Information Act (FOIA) requests furnished documentation pertaining to U.S.-Cameroon policy 
and Peace Corps operations, and a declassification process resulted in the new availability of 
hundreds of pages. For example, FOIA filings brought to light documents showing tension in 
U.S.-Cameroon relations. These documents attest to Ahidjo’s determination to protect 
Cameroon’s sovereignty while simultaneously promoting the nation’s development. Assembled 
and viewed together, these materials challenge prevailing views that Ahidjo was completely a 
“yes man” to the major powers, especially France (Kombi). In addition, new documents and 
interviews raise questions about Peace Corps effectiveness in Cameroon. They point to Ahidjo’s 
discomfort with racism and with other efforts to encourage African Americans to come to 
Cameroon to assist in the nation’s development. In short, they reveal a level of hard-nosed 
realism that has been neglected in scholarly treatments of Ahidjo’s foreign policy.  
A long overdue reappraisal of Ahidjo’s foreign policy is important and for several 
reasons. First, because the United States is a superpower and because its foreign relations matter 
globally, its attention to U.S.-Cameroon relations speaks to the significance of Africa in U.S. 
calculations. Cameroon’s geographical location at the “Armpit of Africa,” between West and 
Central Africa, makes it strategically significant. Serving as a gateway between the former 
British and French colonies in the region, the country is known as the “laboratory of African 
Unity” because of its official Franco-Anglo bilingualism and bicultural structure. It is often 
referred to as “Africa in miniature” or “the microcosm of Africa” as well; from its multiplicity of 
ethnicities and languages spoken inside its borders to its diverse climate and geography, 
Cameroon has come to represent the many faces of Africa and the continent’s deep complexities. 
Repeatedly, those attributes of Cameroon factored into U.S. calculations for the region. In the 
1960s the U.S. sought to use Cameroon as an important gateway into UDEAC countries. 
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Cameroon’s Commercial Attaché in New York Elias Bah Chamfor noted that the U.S. 
considered Cameroon as “most stable and attractive,” adding “the nation had the weight of 
UDEAC behind it in addition to the bilingual nature of the country.”8 The U.S. and other major 
powers knew well and acknowledged the nation’s importance.  
A foreign policy focus also sheds light on wider U.S. regional operations on the African 
continent in the early 1960s and the hub-like status of Cameroon. Although the U.S. established 
diplomatic relations with oil-rich Equatorial Guinea in 1968, between 1970 and 1981, and 1995 
and 2006, the U.S. controlled and monitored its interest in Equatorial Guinea from Yaoundé, 
Cameroon’s capital.9 Cameroon, Virocoulon wrote, was and remains an important nation in the 
region (2015: 2). In the post-World War II era, the U.S. looked at Africa through the lens of the 
Cold War, and its interventions were motivated by defeating communism (Nwaubani 2001; 
Mahoney 1983). Given Cameroon’s strategic location and diversity, and the presence of the 
Union des Populations Du Cameroun (UPC), the nation easily attracted U.S. interest. Robert 
Foulon, who established the first U.S. consulate in Yaoundé stated that the Cold War motivated 
America’s interests.10 In addition, the U.S. sought to promote democratic institutions and free-
market systems in Cameroon and the entire West and Central African region.  
The archival materials demonstrate Cameroon’s centrality to U.S. security interests in the 
West Africa region. The two countries have collaborated militarily at different levels since the 
beginning of Cameroon independence.11 U.S.-Cameroon foreign relations helps to unpack the 
complexity involved in the analysis of the Ahidjo presidency. While he professed 
nonintervention, he did not hesitate to meet with America’s oldest civil rights organization, the 




Finally, building on existing work on U.S. diplomacy toward francophone African 
nations, a focus on Cameroon adds and contributes to evolving literature in the region. Former 
U.S. Ambassador Leland Barrows’ criticism of a preoccupation with Anglophone Africa at the 
expense of French-speaking Africa remains valid (1971: 4). Recent scholarship on Franco-
American competition in Africa has drawn attention to the region. Abou Bamba explains that in 
the Ivory Coast, the U.S. promoted its interest through economic investment and aid. Relatedly, 
Yohann C. Ripert identified measures by which America achieved its post-World War II 
objectives in Senegal. Pierre-Michel Durand looks at Franco-American competition in West 
Africa. Analyzing Cameroon’s place in this debate is important and speaks to the significance of 
francophone Africa in the development of U.S. diplomacy and interests. The newly available 
archival materials personalize Cameroon-U.S. diplomacy and point to how relations between 
individual African nations and the U.S. are also a product of individuals. 
Debating Ahidjo’s Foreign Policy Tactics 
Analyses of Ahidjo’s foreign policy are far from unanimous. A decade after independence Le 
Vine argued that Cameroon’s foreign policy had few “specific objectives” but rather had “such 
vague goals as broader economic, social, and political cooperation” (Le Vine 1971: 174). A 
decade later, Ndiva Kofele-Kale described Ahidjo’s foreign policy as weak, makeshift, and 
“conservative” (1981, 198-199). Unlike other African leaders, he continued, Ahidjo lacked a 
coherent ideology or catchy phrase for his policy like Kwame Nkrumah’s Consciencism and 
Pan-Africanism, Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa, or Léopold Senghor’s Négritude (Kofele-Kale 1981, 
198-199). Kofele-Kale and Le Vine paved the way for more in-depth analysis of the nation’s 
foreign policy. Thierry Virocoulon (2015) supported the makeshift theory, arguing that the 
nation’s foreign policy drifted from the beginning because of failures by the president to initiate 
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and lead. Cameroon is a “pivotal country” Virocoulon wrote, but its leaders squandered 
opportunities to move the nation into a major player in the region (2015, 2). Ada Peter and Remi 
Mbida Mbida concurred, arguing that Ahidjo’s approach to foreign policy was “confrontational,” 
shortsighted, and naive and “effectively alienated Cameroon from the international community” 
(356). His failure to join the British Commonwealth of Nations after reunification while entering 
a series of binding cooperation agreements with France, they added, cemented the foundation for 
future problems of “political unrest, complaints of marginalization, and the threat of separation 
along colonial lines” (356). Anonymous’s (1999) survey of U.S.-Cameroon relations, Peter 
Agbor-Tabi’s (1984) overview of U.S. aid to Cameroon, and Narcisse Mouelle Kombi’s (1996) 
work on Cameroon’s role in international organizations did not engage in an analysis of the 
major components that shaped U.S-Cameroon relations.  
While these studies are important, the lack of access to many primary sources in 
Cameroon’s Ministry of External Relations and related materials in the national archives in 
Yaoundé and Buea means they were based on an incomplete picture. Notwithstanding this 
omission, they paved the way for new directions in the study of Cameroon foreign policy. 
Mélanie Torrent disagreed that Ahidjo’s diplomacy toward France and Britain can be framed as 
makeshift and weak. Based on extensive use of archival sources in France, Britain, and 
Cameroon, Torrent argues that Ahidjo capitalized on his country’s dual colonial heritage to gain 
more leverage and “instilled a strong sense of realism in Cameroonian diplomacy” (6). Ahidjo, 
Torrent continued, was aware of the “constraints that limited resources placed” on his foreign 
policy actions and as a result remained extremely “cautious and pragmatic” (6). Moses Tesi 
agreed, adding Ahidjo navigated complex situations to protect Cameroon’s sovereignty and 
promote the nation’s development (2017).  
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Building on these observations, newly available archival materials enable scholars to 
expand analysis to incorporate Cameroon’s foreign relations toward the United States. In their 
focus on Cameroon’s economic, military, and cultural agreements with the United States and 
their exploration of the impact of the Peace Corps, the new archival material reveals that Ahidjo 
was savvier in foreign policy than previously known. The evidence shows that unlike other 
African leaders, Ahidjo did not restrict his policy to specific dogmas. He was flexible and, in 
many cases, acted rather than waited. Evidence also shows that in relations with the U.S., Ahidjo 
focused on initiatives to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty and promote its development. These 
accounts suggest that Ahidjo’s policy directions—specifically the 1960s, when he developed 
foundational policies—outlasted him and continued under the Biya regime. 
The United States and the Evolution of African Foreign Policy 
In the immediate period after World War II, the need for a more coordinated U.S.-African policy 
became apparent. Before the start of the Cold War, the United States generally maintained a 
hands-off policy on Africa. But the post-World War II ideological conflict changed things, and 
the person who championed the creation of an African policy was John F. Kennedy. In the 
1950s, he warned of the emerging forces of nationalism in the developing areas and called on 
America to adjust. In 1957, Kennedy informed France that “their overseas territories are 
eventually going to break free and look with suspicion on Western nations who impeded their 
steps to independence.” Though the brickbats were quick to fall, he did not back down, insisting 
America’s failure to side with Africa’s nationalist movements was being “exploited by the 
Soviets” (Mahoney 1983: 20).  
But political calculations also influenced Kennedy’s focus on Africa. His team was aware 
of the interactions between Africans and African Americans. Both groups shared a common past 
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and a historic relationship. In 1957 prominent African Americans including Ralph Bunche, Rev. 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and Asa Philip Randolph attended Ghana’s independence 
celebration. Later, Bunche remarked about the relation between both groups: “We embrace you 
because we are brothers” (Blyden 2019: 182). In addition, Dr. King’s sermon “The Birth of a 
New Nation,” delivered after his trip to Ghana in 1957, linked the colonization of Africa and Jim 
Crow practices in America: “Both segregation in America and colonialism in Africa … were 
based on the same thing—white supremacy and contempt for life.”12 In 1959, when Sékou 
Touré, the first president of Guinea, visited Harlem, he experienced an outpouring of support. 
Nemata Amelia Ibitayo Blyden has written that African Americans saw Ghanaian President 
Kwame Nkrumah and Touré as a “source of pride … and symbols of black potential” (183). His 
pro-Africa message was a calculated move to earn votes from African Americans. Kennedy, 
Thomas Noer wrote, “courted black votes …[and] effectively used the Africa issue to appeal to 
voters” (1985: 58-59). Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 presidential election translated into a 
victory for new directions in U.S.-African policy.  
Cameroon and Cold War Diplomacy 
The end of World War II ushered in the beginning of the Cold War, and the two superpowers, 
the United States and the USSR, struggled to promote their ideologies and expand their zones of 
influence, first in Europe and later into developing areas. In 1947, U.S. President Harry S. 
Truman responded to a request for help from Greece and Turkey by issuing the Truman 
Doctrine, committing America to resist the spread of communism anywhere. Truman’s 
successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, developed a policy he called “massive retaliation,” promising 
to use America’s bombs to stop the spread of communism. In addition, he expanded the role of 
America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from gathering information to conducting 
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subversive acts against those he considered to be communist suspects. Patrice Lumumba of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo was among those targeted. CIA Director Allen Dulles 
described him as “a Castro or worse” (Noer 1985: 138). Kennedy’s addition to the policy of 
containment was the strategy of “flexible response,” which meant America would use any tool in 
its arsenal to stop communism (Gaddis 2005).  
Washington was determined that Africa not become “aligned with the USSR.” Africa, 
Ebere Nwaubani has written, had to be “acculturated into a global setting conducive to United 
States national security interest … thereby warding off countervailing influences such as 
‘communism’ and non-alignment” (2001: 32). To succeed, America had to confront the legacy 
of European colonialism. Kennedy began that process in the 1950s and continued with it through 
his presidency. Charles de Gaulle and officials in Paris were livid at Kennedy’s pronouncements. 
But Kennedy was not deterred. Repeatedly, he stated: “I want the people in … Africa … to start 
to look to America … what the President of the United States is doing, not … Khrushchev or the 
Chinese Communists” (Sorenson 1965: 199). Though Kennedy did not intend for America to 
take France’s position in Africa, Philip E. Muehlenbeck has argued that he wanted to “compete” 
with de Gaulle in the region and requested the establishment of an American embassy in each 
Francophone African country (166-67; Durand: 131).  
Whatever the rights and wrongs of Franco-American competition in Africa, America’s 
involvement in West Africa was consistent with Washington’s thinking. In the Ivory Coast, 
Bamba has argued that on the heels of America’s investment came the establishment of a 
consulate office in 1956. In 1957, the U.S. State Department sent Foulon to establish a consulate 
office in Yaoundé, and he stated Cameroon was important to the U.S. in the “Cold War 
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context.”13 He added that working in Yaoundé was challenging because of the pro-communist 
UPC activities.  
Established in 1948, the UPC stood for reunification of the two Cameroons and full 
independence. The party’s leadership—Ruben Um Nyobè, Félix-Roland Moumié, Théodore 
Mayi-Matip, Ernest Ouandié, and Abel Kingué—mobilized the masses, secured inroads into 
rural areas, and vowed not to rest until they achieved their objectives. Following a strike in 1955, 
French officials banned the UPC, and it took its activities underground. In addition to the 
uncertainty presented by the UPC, the French perceived Foulon and his team as “intruders” in 
the city. Irrespective of the situation, the consulate office formally opened on July 5, 1957, and in 
two years, the consulate became a consulate general, placing relations with Ahidjo on good 
footing. On March 17, 1959, Ahidjo visited Eisenhower in the White House. Ahidjo was in the 
United States to address the United Nations General Assembly and to garner support for 
Cameroon’s upcoming independence in 1960. Those two events mortified the UPC leadership, 
which asked the major countries to push for a UN-sponsored plebiscite to determine whether 
Cameroonians supported France’s independence plan for the territory. They insisted that the 
struggle in Cameroon was larger than a “domestic matter within the French community.” 
Moumié appealed to Eisenhower to support a plan in which “each state defines its future position 
in relation to the African continent” (White: 35-36). Eisenhower dismissed him as “an exiled 
communist-influenced politician” and did not respond to his letter (White: 36). On January 1, 
1960, French Cameroon obtained independence and became the Republic of Cameroon. In 1961, 
the U.S. upgraded the American consular office in Yaoundé to an embassy, and four years later, 
an embassy office opened in Douala. Simultaneously, Cameroon created an embassy in 
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Washington, D.C., in 1960 and a permanent mission to the UN in New York. During the 
Kennedy era, Cameroon-U.S. relations began to become a reality. 
The Architecture of Cameroon-U.S. Policy 
On January 19, 1961, Ahidjo sent a congratulatory message to Kennedy for his inauguration; in 
response, Kennedy praised Ahidjo as a man whose leadership had “won for him the respect of 
world leaders.”14 To dramatize the new directions in relations, Kennedy invited Ahidjo to the 
U.S. for an official visit. On March 13, 1962, Ahidjo arrived in Washington for a five-day visit to 
the United States. Kennedy himself welcomed Ahidjo at the airport. While in the U.S., Ahidjo 
met with Kennedy; visited New York; and met with the NAACP, the City Council of the District 
of Columbia, the heads of diplomatic missions, and the leaders of the Overseas Press Club.15 
Perhaps a most remarkable aspect of Ahidjo’s visit to America was the frank nature of his 
conversations with Kennedy. In a single sentence, he articulated the goals of Cameroon policy: 
“My country bases its relationships with other nations on the principles of equality, non-
interference, and mutual respect of sovereignty.” Ahidjo also noted that the world should not rest 
until all of Africa was liberated from colonial chains. “We feel it is extremely urgent to 
accelerate the process of decolonization,” he stated.16 Later in a dinner toast speech, Ahidjo 
emphasized his nation’s non-alignment position adding that Cameroon would neither be a 
participant nor a “testing ground in the Cold War,” but a place for “genuine relationship.”17 
Irrespective of who occupied the White House, Ahidjo’s message was consistent. He focused on 
assistance, cooperation, complete liberation of Africa, and peace. Four years later, on October 
24, 1967, he told President Lyndon B Johnson: “Cooperation today in our world is a basic 
requirement,” adding that it led to the advancement of all.18 In 1982 in Washington DC., a few 
months before he resigned as president, he buttressed to President Ronald Reagan the urgent 
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need to dismantle South Africa’s apartheid policy and for Reagan to support a “framework of 
cooperation between industrialized and developing countries as part of global negotiations to 
usher in a new international economic order.”19 
In dealings with U.S. leaders, Ahidjo repeatedly sounded globalist causes of peace and 
justice. He used his standing within the world’s community to leverage assistance for his 
country, and it did not go unnoticed. “British diplomats,” Torrent wrote, lauded “Cameroon’s 
essentially realist and pragmatist approach to foreign affairs and diplomacy” (222). Yet few 
world leaders paid attention to the brutal regime Ahidjo instituted at home. Given the importance 
of Cameroon’s strategic location to peace in the West and Central African region, America and 
other major powers focused on the nation’s stability irrespective of the means by which peace 
was obtained.  
A particularly important topic Ahidjo addressed during his visit to the U.S. was anti-
black racism. According to him, racism was at the root of the debasement of blacks globally. He 
wrote in the Contribution to National Construction: “Each time a black man [woman] is 
humiliated anywhere in the world, all Negroes the world over are hurt” (1964: 44-45). He met 
with the NAACP and praised the organization for its willingness to unite with Africa “in a 
world-wide movement to fight against the evils of racial discrimination, injustice, racial 
prejudices, and hatred.”20 In addition, he invited them to visit Cameroon.  
Economic, Military, and Cultural Relations 
From the very inception of Cameroon’s independence, U.S. assistance has played a significant 
role in the nation’s economic development. Cameroon emerged from colonialism with very weak 
educational and economic systems. The situation was worse in former British Southern 
Cameroons, where education, hospitals, and economic establishments were in short supply. 
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During most of British trusteeship over Cameroon, Nigeria governed British Southern 
Cameroons as a colony, and at the time of independence, almost nothing worked there. The 
infrastructure was almost nonexistent, and electric power and water systems were severely 
limited (Amaazee 1990). Ahidjo had every reason to request urgent economic assistance for his 
country. After his first visit to the former British Southern Cameroons, he expressed disbelief at 
the low level of development there (Nfi 2014). 
As suggested previously, Ahidjo’s visit with Kennedy was a critically important event. 
Yet the context in which discussions between both leaders occurred provided insight into 
Ahidjo’s conduct of diplomacy. Documents declassified through FOIA requests show that 
relations between both countries were “strained” prior to Ahidjo’s visit. Ahidjo resented the U.S. 
for not supporting Cameroon’s position at the UN after British Northern Cameroons voted in a 
plebiscite to join Nigeria. Ahidjo protested the results of the plebiscite, but nothing changed. He 
was angered that Washington officials were not “favorably impressed by the caliber of 
Cameroonian leaders.” The U.S. had asked that Cameroon’s Ambassador in Washington 
Raymond Aimé-N’Thepe be recalled because he “threatened a fencing contractor with a gun.”21 
A November 18, 1961 memorandum described him “as an anti-white racist and is highly 
emotional and unstable when excited or placed under pressure.”22 Also, Ahidjo’s government 
was furious that U.S. Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg’s visit to Cameroon was canceled on 
a twenty-four notice, and no concrete reason was given. Determined to reset the relations, 
Washington officials were eager to repair things and noted that “our invitation to President 
Ahidjo has been very well received by him and his government.”23  
During the visit, both leaders discussed a variety of political, economic, and educational 
assistance packages for Cameroon.24 Ahidjo expressed to Kennedy his concerns over the 
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ongoing security threats posed by the UPC in Cameroon, proposing that the United States assist 
Cameroon “to fight against ideological influences contrary to our principles and our common 
ideals.”25 At a time when Washington’s containment policy made no distinction between 
nationalist uprisings for legitimate reforms and communist insurrections, Kennedy easily 
accepted Ahidjo’s label of the UPC as a communist organization. In addition, Ahidjo asked 
Kennedy for help to neutralize the excessive influence and domination of his country by France. 
Ahidjo’s request was a gutsy move. Publicly, Ahidjo praised France’s assistance to Cameroon, 
writing that France “has never ceased to give Cameroon proof of her friendship and her concern” 
(Ahidjo: 47). Given the role France played in his ascension to power, its assistance to his 
country, and the ongoing war against the UPC, Ahidjo’s action revealed his style of diplomacy. 
Ahidjo’s desire to curtail France’s influence in his country was not unique. In Senegal, Ripert 
has argued that Leopold Senghor sought to use America to “alleviate the power of France’s 
economic influence” (5). Houphouët-Boigny, Bamba has argued, applied a similar approach in 
the Ivory Coast. In a 1965 oral interview archived at the Kennedy Library, William Attwood, 
who served as ambassador during the Kennedy era, stated that African leaders appreciated 
Kennedy because he treated them with respect. The Kennedy “legend is very great” in Africa, he 
added.  
Also, Ahidjo spoke to Kennedy about Cameroon’s twenty-year plan, and indicated he 
“would like U.S. aid [to] be adapted to meet long range needs in the plan.”26 Prior to Ahidjo’s 
visit, America was already sending aid to Cameroon and Kennedy promised more help through 
USAID. The Peace Corps was also available to contribute to the nation’s development. On 
December 8, 1961, Cameroon and the United States signed an agreement for economic, 
technical, and related assistance.27 In an October 7, 1963, memorandum to McGeorge Bundy at 
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the White House, Benjamin H. Read, executive secretary at the Department of State noted that 
“US-Cameroon relations improved noticeably following that visit and they have continued good 
since that time.”28 Basking in the positive relations, Ahidjo stated that Kennedy was his “hero” 
(Barrows 1971: 11). 
Soon after Ahidjo’s visit to Washington, D.C., significant aid began to flow to Cameroon. 
In July 1963, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs Mennen Williams visited 
Cameroon. His visit “reaffirmed the positive relations which exist between both countries.”29 In 
1963, Cameroonians were studying in the United States under the U.S. Educational Exchange 
Program and the Afro-American Institute.30 In 1963, USAID provided road equipment to 
Cameroon’s Public Works Department (PWD), the agency charged with road development in 
West Cameroon. The equipment included Caterpillar tractors, farm-size tractors, front-end 
loaders, motor graders, trucks, rear-end dump trucks, low-bed trailers, pneumatic rollers, air 
compressors and attachments, and portable crushing and screening plant (Anonymous 1992). A 
foundation also formed for collaboration in trade. On October 31, 1964, Frank Coffin, then the 
U.S. representative to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, attended the ceremony to formally launch the construction of the 
Trans-Cameroon Railroad. The United States contributed $9.2 million for the project.31 This 
marked the beginning of more trade and investment initiatives during the Ahidjo era. Private 
organizations, including Operation Crossroads Africa (OCA), also provided developmental aid to 
Cameroon.32 On April 18, 1966, Decree No. 65-DF-186 extended to the entire country the 
agreement for assistance between Cameroon and Catholic Relief Services, initially signed on 
November 28, 1960, by the organization and the Republic of Cameroon.33 The U.S. government 
designed and funded the self-help programs to “benefit a large population.”34 Between 1974 and 
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1975, programs received funding in several regions including Nyong et Kele, Sanaga-Maritine, 
Bui, Donga-Mantung, Fako, Manyu, Meme, and Ndian.35 
Though Washington considered the 1960s as the “Development Decade” for Africa 
(Grubbs 2009), progress in the continent remained slow. Cameroon’s economy still depended on 
foreign assistance. But the U.S. fulfilled Kennedy’s promise to establish diplomatic relations and 
provide aid to each Francophone African nation. By the end of the decade, the United States had 
well-established relations with Cameroon, and aid programs to Cameroon included the Peace 
Corps, USAID, and several initiatives through non-profit organizations.  
In 1971, Cameroon signed an agreement to renovate the Douala seaport and residences 
for professors at the Higher School of Agriculture.36 In 1974, Cameroon and the Near East 
Foundation organization signed an agreement to improve “poultry production and horticulture 
and vegetable production.”37 The same year, the U.S. government allocated $5 million for 
development projects in Cameroon to improve health systems, nutrition, water systems, 
education, and other initiatives of national interest. In 1982, the Agricultural Education Project in 
collaboration with USAID supported the creation a government university in Dschang focusing 
on agriculture. The goal of the project was to create a university to “enhance productivity of the 
agricultural sector.”38 In the post-Ahidjo years, the United States would expand programs in 
Cameroon in a variety of areas, including collaboration with agencies such as the U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention to prevent the spread of a variety of viruses.39 
Though Cameroon needed aid, the leadership frequently sought and received information 
about private initiatives toward development prior to inviting them into the country. For 
example, in 1973 when the Lutheran World Relief, Inc. requested permission to come to 
Cameroon to carry out development projects in the Adamaoua/Benue region, the Cameroon 
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government hesitated because it was a Christian organization attempting to move into an 
overwhelmingly Muslim dominated area.40 Along similar lines when the Lang Engineering 
Corporation based in Coral Cables, Florida, applied for permission to work in Cameroon, the 
Cameroon government requested information about the company from the U.S. embassy.41 
Cameroonian officials worked to ensure foreign aid was consistent with national policies.  
Trade between Cameroon and the United States grew steadily from 1960. In 1960, 
Cameroon’s exports to the United States totaled 1,503 billion FCFA; in 1963, that amount 
increased to 2,365 billion FCFA. During the same period, U.S. imports from Cameroon rose 
from 833 million FCFA to 1,552 billion FCFA.42 Over 50% of the exports to the United States 
were raw materials including cocoa, timber, rubber, and petroleum products.  
Ahidjo’s policies created a pathway for the future, and much development took place 
after he left office. For example, Cameroon became a member of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allowed Cameroonian goods into the American market duty-
free. Many U.S. agencies and companies—including Overseas Private Investment Corporations 
(OPIC), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Export-Import Bank of the United States, and 
the U.S. Trade and Development Agency—operated in Cameroon. In 2008, the United States 
was among the largest foreign direct investors in Cameroon because of its large equity in the 
Chad-Cameroonian oil pipeline and power sector.43  
Military collaboration has been particularly significant in Cameroon-U.S. relations. 
During the Ahidjo era, members of the Cameroon military trained at different institutions in the 
United States. In the 1980s, Cameroon became a participant in the Service Academy Foreign 
Student Program, whereby qualified Cameroonians gained admission into the U.S. Army, Air 
Force, Navy, and Coast Guard academies.44 About 12% of U.S. aid to Cameroon was geared 
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toward national security, with the United States helping Cameroon to better police its borders 
and providing biometrics capability for tracking criminals and preventing human trafficking. 
Cameroon and the United States have collaborated extensively on a variety of issues 
including military, human rights, and refugees and the record shows that the foundation 
established during the Ahidjo years remains the guiding framework of the relationship. 
Documents at Cameroon’s Ministry of External Relations show frequent visits from U.S. 
military officers, congressional delegations, and government representatives to Yaoundé, and 
that Cameroon remains a valuable U.S. partner in the region.45 
Cameroonian Development and the U.S. Peace Corps  
Capitalizing on the new relationship with Kennedy, Ahidjo moved quickly to sign an agreement 
for U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers to serve in his country. It was a significant move. In 1961, after 
French speaking East Cameroon and English speaking British Southern Cameroons (West 
Cameroon) reunified to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the nation’s economic and 
social institutions were in a sorry state. Reunification ended West Cameroon’s favorable trade 
arrangement with the Commonwealth countries, and that aggravated an already desperate 
economic situation. Though Cameroon’s first five years plan (1961- 66) prioritized road 
construction and educational improvement as most essential for national development, there was 
a critical shortage of trained manpower to bring those goals to fruition. At the time of 
reunification, there were too few primary and secondary schools in West Cameroon. In addition, 
the only technical school in the region, the Government Trade Centre (GTC), located at Ombe, 
had closed its doors because its staff, mostly composed of British expatriates left Cameroon. As 
was the case with Ombe, primary schools lacked qualified teachers, textbooks, teaching aids, and 
adequate classrooms. In 1961, over 60% of the primary school teachers were ill equipped, ill 
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prepared, and uncertified and many were hired on a temporary basis. Classrooms contained the 
“barest essentials—wooden desks, benches, and a single blackboard” (Anonymous 1992: 61). 
Secondary schools faced similar problems. There was a critical shortage of qualified teaching 
staff in those schools. Compounding the problems was that the budget to purchase basic 
necessities such as chalk, pens, and books was grossly inadequate (Mengot 1967). Given chronic 
shortages of trained personnel, it was no surprise that Ahidjo turned to the Peace Corps, an action 
which exemplified his pragmatism.  
Created at the height of the Cold War, Peace Corps legislation charged the agency with 
assisting developing nations in meeting “their needs for trained manpower, and to help promote a 
better understanding of the American people on the part of the peoples served and a better 
understanding of other peoples on the part of the American people.”46 During its nearly sixty 
years’ presence in Cameroon, the Peace Corps has made a difference in the country’s material 
and cultural development. Its impact have been felt in education, agriculture, community 
development, small-enterprise development (SED), women empowerment, health care, and 
HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention.47 On July 23, 1962, Peace Corps officials signed an 
agreement with the Cameroon government, and in September, the first batch of volunteers 
arrived. A new group has arrived in the country annually since then bringing the total number of 
volunteers to over 3680 since inception.48 
Remarkable achievements occurred during the first decade of Peace Corps services in 
Cameroon. By 1964, the 77 volunteers in West Cameroon made up 30% of the post-primary 
teaching personnel; the previous year, there had been 83 volunteers teaching. In short, West 
Cameroon’s educational system depended heavily on the volunteers. By the end of the first year 
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of service, West Cameroon Prime Minister John Ngu Foncha praised the volunteers’ work as 
“exemplary and admirable.”49 
For all the successes, recruitment and preparation for service in Cameroon included 
disturbing aspects. During much of the 1960s, training took place in the United States, and after 
that it moved to Cameroon. At training, volunteers learned local languages, cross-cultural skills, 
and related issues. But those sessions failed to teach specific skills. Jack Vaughn, the Peace 
Corps’s second director, underscored the problem: Volunteers “arrived overseas with an 
inadequate knowledge of the host country language, an incomplete appreciation of the host 
country culture, and insufficient amount of technical skill” (Schwarz 1991: 51). Fifty years later, 
the problems remained. In Post Books and journals, volunteers blamed weaknesses on their 
mediocre knowledge of local culture.50 The Peace Corps has yet to transition to the recruitment 
of volunteers with specific skills.  
Take the area of teaching, for example. The volunteers were unfamiliar with the 
educational system. Moreover, the main qualification of many of those assigned to the teaching 
English as a foreign language (TEFL) program was that they were native speakers of English, 
and that was insufficient. Only a few volunteers majored in English or education, and they 
lacked the pedagogical skills to serve as teachers. A 2011 Peace Corps host country impact study 
on Cameroon concluded that volunteers lacked “training in pedagogy.” But this was a common 
problem with the Peace Corps, as Jonathan Zimmerman concluded: “For many Volunteer 
teachers in Africa lesson planning, lecturing, homework assignments, and student discipline all 
proved enormous hurdles for Americans” (2006: 143). Associate Peace Corps country director 
Sammy Enyong, himself a former student of volunteers, supervised volunteers’ teaching for 
almost two decades. Enyong stated that “some of them were not just qualified for the job they 
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came to perform.” Some were in Cameroon “for tourism” and “a 2-year paid vacation,” he 
added. Robert Strauss, former Peace Corps country director in Cameroon, concurred: It is “much 
less clear what inexperienced Americans have to offer” Cameroonians. Another longtime Peace 
Corps employee in Cameroon agreed: “The volunteers who come do not have any experience, 
are not qualified, they are very young. Most often, the objectives of these volunteers are not in 
line with that of Peace Corps.” Volunteers “have diplomas without experience” and were in 
Cameroon “just to improve their academic c.v.,” others stated.51 
Making matters worse was a general suspicion during the early years that the Peace 
Corps volunteers were members of the CIA. In a 1963 memo, West Cameroon’s assistant chief 
of security, P. Bessala, said the Volunteers were “instructed … to be social and amicable” to 
locals in order to obtain as much information from them as possible, adding that volunteers’ 
“activities in the Territory are under observation by all services as it is feared they are doing 
ESPIONAGE as ALLEN DULLES, the Director of U.S. Intelligence Service, did in Russia.”52 
Given the Cold War and the CIA activities in Africa, those suspicions were widespread. 
Nkrumah of Ghana described volunteers as “subversive agents” recruited by the CIA, adding that 
the Peace Corps was an “instrument of … Western psychological warfare.” A Peace Corps 
evaluator wrote that in Ghana, volunteers were repeatedly asked, “You are not a spy, are you?” 
(Richter 1965: 7; Hoffman 1998: 160-161). On a visit to Touré’s Guinea, David Hapgood, a 
Peace Corps evaluator, noted immense “cynicism about why the Peace Corps was in Guinea,” 
and an angry volunteer told him, “I have gone through hell this past two years. Why did the 
Peace Corps do this to me?” (1965: 29). In Nigeria, things erupted following the Margery 
Michelmore incident; soon after arrival in Nigeria in 1961, Michelmore wrote a postcard to send 
back to family in the United States in which she described the “squalor and absolutely primitive 
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living conditions rampant in the city and in the bush” in Nigeria, but on the way to the post 
office, the card fell out of her purse and ended up in the hands of students of the University of 
Ibadan. The response was swift. The students were livid and demanded the eviction of the 
volunteers from Nigeria, labeling them as “America’s international spies” and the program as a 
“scheme designed to foster neo-colonialism” (Rice 1985, 241-42). Eventually a major crisis was 
averted. The Peace Corps did not leave Nigeria but learned to be more careful in their criticism 
of the host country. The early years of volunteers’ service were fraught with problems.  
Those weaknesses and problems did not overshadow the friendship and goodwill shared 
between Peace Corps volunteers and locals. In Guinea, after the eviction of volunteers, locals 
made it a point to thank and inform them that their problem was the U.S. government and not the 
volunteers (Guinea 1966). In Cameroonian villages volunteers were frequently at neighbors’ 
homes dining and planning future projects. Cameroonians overwhelmingly appreciated 
volunteers’ services.53 Peace Corps service and diplomacy imploded previous notions of the 
“ugly America” image and replaced it with a lasting goodwill toward the U.S.  
Yet Peace Corps service in Cameroon and the rest of Africa must also be judged based on 
the organization’s goals. In the agency’s nearly sixty years in Africa, it can justifiably be stated 
that the Peace Corps achieved two of its three goals. Volunteers made friends for the United 
States and helped to educate locals about American life. However, their performance in the more 
important goal of providing “trained manpower” to developing nations remains at best mediocre. 
Conclusion 
Ahidjo was president of Cameroon for twenty-two years, and by the time he left office, he had 
shaped the nation’s foreign policy for generations. Cameroon foreign policy would be conducted 
the Ahidjo way. Programs Ahidjo started and that defined the U.S.-Cameroon relationship have 
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remained intact—from the Peace Corps and USAID to military collaboration, nonintervention in 
Cameroon’s domestic policy, planned liberalism, and economic development. Ahidjo mastered 
the use of foreign policy to leverage his grip on power and divert attention from the brutal 
regime he created at home. A protagonist of the policy of nonalignment, Ahidjo developed 
friendships with communist and non-communist countries. He visited Washington, Moscow, 
Beijing, London, and many other places and formed alliances with leaders who lived in those 
capital cities. He effectively leveraged and convinced major powers of the strategic importance 
of his country as a gateway to peace and security in the West African and Central African 
regions. He did not waver in his crusade against South Africa’s apartheid. His meeting with the 
NAACP reminded Africans to seek avenues to collaborate with African Americans. He emerged 
as one of the more reputable statesmen in the continent. By the time he left office, Cameroon had 
a reputation for stability and peace.  
Ahidjo bequeathed to his successor a foreign policy that placed primacy on the nation’s 
sovereignty and development. He stood up to France at key moments and resisted attempts by 
the U.S. to undermine his country. In 1961, when the U.S. delayed a meeting between 
Cameroon’s ambassador in Washington and Kennedy, the Cameroon government informed 
Washington that “unless Ambassador N’Thepe is allowed to see President Kennedy to present 
his new Letter and say goodbye, the Cameroon Government no longer will receive the American 
Ambassasdor.”54 The policy of asserting its authority and sovereignty continued in the post-
Ahidjo years. Repeatedly, Cameroonian officials warned U.S. officials in Yaoundé to steer clear 
of Cameroon’s internal politics (Morse 2019). In later years, events such as removing the offices 
of USAID from Yaoundé to Accra and the loss of membership in AGOA showed that Cameroon 
was willing to pay any price to safeguard its national sovereignty.  
27 
 
The Cameroon situation was not unique. Other African nations in the region had acted 
alike. When the United States denied selling weapons to Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, he turned 
to Russia. When the United States followed France’s pronouncement to deny assistance to 
Touré’s Guinea, Touré turned to Russia. When the Western nations placed restrictive conditions 
on Africa’s request for assistance, China saw an opening, created the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), and easily used slogans of “respect for sovereignty and non-
interference,” and “peace, equality, justice, and freedom” to woo African leaders to its side. And 
Cameroon was a member of FOCAC from the beginning. For all Ahidjo’s weaknesses, his 
foreign policy earned Cameroon respect around the world.  
But those achievements created a false sense of security as Ahidjo increasingly misread 
the signs of the times. Like the rabbit in the Brer Rabbit folktales, he overestimated his ability to 
navigate complex situations, and a miscalculation ended his political career. “Domestic policy 
can only defeat us;” Kennedy often stated, adding “but foreign policy can kill us.” In this case, 
that statement held true. For a brief period, it looked as if Ahidjo had gained more independence 
from France as he requested when he first met Kennedy. He took the opposite position against 
France in the Nigerian Civil War. He pulled Cameroon out of Air Afrique, bought airplanes from 
America’s Boeing company instead of the European-based Airbus and was among the first 
leaders in Francophone Africa to “Africanize” the country’s civil service. And so, it went. 
Eventually, France had enough of him. Apparently tricked by French doctors during a medical 
check-up in Paris, Ahidjo hurriedly resigned and handed power to his successor. His abdication 
served as a lesson to leaders of Francophone African nations that those who cross France may 
not last much longer in power. And France’s allies in the western alliance system would not 
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intervene to assist African leaders irrespective of the cordial relations as was the case with 
Ahidjo.  
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